Dean Rusk

3.2.1. Korean Peninsula Division and UN Relations

In August 1945, Rusk played a significant role in the drafting of "General Order No. 1," the surrender document for Japanese forces. Specifically, he and Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel III proposed the division of the Korean Peninsula into American and Soviet spheres of influence at the 38th parallel north. This proposal was accepted by the Soviet Union, leading to the de facto division of Korea.

In February 1946, Rusk officially moved to the State Department. Following Alger Hiss's departure in January 1947, Rusk succeeded him as the director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (later the UN Bureau), a position he held until 1949. During this period, he was instrumental in the establishment of the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), demonstrating his commitment to post-war international cooperation and containment of communism. In 1948, Rusk supported Secretary of State George C. Marshall in advising President Harry S. Truman against recognizing Israel, fearing it would harm relations with oil-rich Arab states like Saudi Arabia. However, Truman, influenced by his legal counsel Clark Clifford, decided to recognize Israel. Rusk, who admired Marshall's loyalty to the President's ultimate authority in foreign policy, supported Marshall's decision and often quoted Truman's remark: "The president makes the foreign policy." In 1949, he was appointed Deputy Undersecretary of State under Dean Acheson, who had replaced Marshall.

3.2.2. Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

In 1950, Rusk was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at his own request, believing he had the most expertise in Asian affairs. He played an influential part in the U.S. decision to intervene in the Korean War. He also contributed to Japan's post-war compensation for victorious countries, as evidenced by the Rusk documents, and signed the Japan-US Administrative Agreement in Tokyo in 1952. Rusk was known as a cautious diplomat who consistently sought international support for U.S. policies. While he favored supporting Asian nationalist movements, arguing that European imperialism was unsustainable in Asia, the Atlanticist Acheson prioritized closer relations with European powers, which often precluded American support for Asian nationalism. Rusk, despite his personal leanings, dutifully supported Acheson's policy.

3.2.3. Korean War and East Asian Policy

Rusk's role in the Korean War was significant. When the war broke out on June 25, 1950, Rusk, as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, was immediately informed by W. Bradley Connors and instructed the U.S. Ambassador to Korea, John J. Muccio, to verify reports of the invasion.

Regarding French Indochina, Rusk advocated for U.S. support of the French government against the Communist Viet Minh guerrillas. He argued that the Viet Minh were merely instruments of Soviet expansionism in Asia and that refusing to support the French would amount to appeasement. Under strong American pressure, France granted nominal independence to the State of Vietnam in February 1950 under Bảo Đại, which the U.S. recognized within days. However, it was widely known that the State of Vietnam remained effectively a French colony. In June 1950, Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stating that the conflict was "a civil war that has been in effect captured by the [Soviet] Politburo and... turned into a tool of the Politburo. So it isn't a civil war in the usual sense. It is part of the international war... We have to look at in terms of which side we are on in this particular kind of struggle... Because Ho Chi Minh is tied with the Politburo, our policy is to support Bao Dai and the French in Indochina until we have time to help them establish a going concern."

In April 1951, President Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur as commander of American forces in Korea over the issue of expanding the war into China. In May 1951, Rusk gave a speech at a dinner sponsored by the China Institute in Washington, implying that the U.S. should unify Korea under Syngman Rhee and overthrow Mao Zedong in China. This speech, which Rusk had not submitted to the State Department in advance, attracted significant attention, with columnist Walter Lippmann accusing Rusk of advocating for unconditional surrender in the Korean War. For embarrassing Acheson, Rusk was forced to resign from his position and moved to the private sector.

4.1.1. Nomination and Appointment as Secretary of State

On December 12, 1960, President-elect John F. Kennedy nominated Rusk to be Secretary of State. Rusk was not Kennedy's initial choice; his first preference, J. William Fulbright, proved too controversial due to his support for segregation. Rusk was described by David Halberstam as "everybody's number two" choice. Kennedy's interest was piqued by an article Rusk had recently written in Foreign Affairs titled "The President," which advocated for the president to direct foreign policy with the Secretary of State serving as a mere advisor.

Despite Kennedy's insistence, Rusk was not particularly eager for the position, as the annual salary for Secretary of State was 25.00 K USD, significantly less than the 60.00 K USD he earned as director of the Rockefeller Foundation. However, Rusk ultimately accepted the role out of a strong sense of patriotism. Kennedy biographer Robert Dallek noted that Kennedy, aiming to control foreign policy from the White House, chose Rusk as an "acceptable last choice" who would be a "faceless, faithful bureaucrat" rather than a leader. Kennedy often addressed him as "Mr. Rusk" rather than Dean, indicating a more formal and distant relationship.

Rusk took charge of a department that, despite being half its previous size, still employed 23.00 K people, including 6.00 K Foreign Service officers, and maintained diplomatic relations with 98 countries.

4.1.2. Major Foreign Policy Initiatives (Cuban Missile Crisis, etc.)

Rusk's tenure began with a faith in using military action to combat communism. Despite private misgivings about the Bay of Pigs Invasion, he remained noncommittal during executive council meetings and never openly opposed it. Early in his term, he harbored doubts about U.S. intervention in Vietnam, but he later became a staunch supporter. He often allied with the equally hawkish Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in debates within the Cabinet and the National Security Council.

In March 1961, Rusk expressed considerable frustration over the Laotian Civil War, noting reports that both sides paused combat for a ten-day water festival. Drawing on his World War II experience, he doubted that bombing alone would stop the Pathet Lao, emphasizing that bombing was only effective with ground troops to hold or advance territory. In April 1961, when a proposal to send 100 more American military advisors to South Vietnam (bringing the total to 800) came before Kennedy, Rusk argued for its acceptance, even though it violated the 1954 Geneva Accords, which limited foreign military personnel to 700. He suggested that the International Control Commission should not be informed and advisors be "placed in varied locations to avoid attention." While Rusk favored a hawkish approach to Laos, Kennedy decided against it due to the lack of modern airfields and the risk of Chinese intervention. Rusk opened the Geneva conference on neutralizing Laos but predicted its failure to Kennedy.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, Rusk strongly supported diplomatic efforts. A review of Kennedy's audio recordings of the EXCOMM meetings by Sheldon Stern, Head of the JFK Library, suggests that Rusk's contributions likely averted a nuclear war.

Rusk also continued his interest from the Rockefeller Foundation in aiding developing nations and supported low tariffs to encourage world trade.

4.1.3. Relationship with President Kennedy

As Rusk recounted in his autobiography, As I Saw It, his relationship with President Kennedy was not particularly strong. Kennedy was often irritated by Rusk's reticence in advisory sessions and felt that the State Department was "like a bowl of jelly" and "never comes up with any new ideas." In 1963, Newsweek ran a cover story on National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy titled "Cool Head for the Cold War," asserting that Bundy was "the real Secretary of State" and that Rusk "was not known for his force and decisiveness." Special Counsel to the President Ted Sorensen believed Kennedy acted as his own Secretary of State and often expressed impatience with Rusk, feeling he was under-prepared for emergency meetings. Rusk repeatedly offered his resignation, but it was never accepted.

4.2.1. Vietnam War Policy

After Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, Rusk offered his resignation to the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson. However, Johnson, who appreciated Rusk's loyalty and steady demeanor, refused his resignation, and Rusk remained Secretary of State throughout Johnson's term. Rusk quickly became one of Johnson's favorite advisors.

Rusk became known as one of the Vietnam War's strongest supporters. In June 1964, Rusk met with Hervé Alphand, the French ambassador in Washington, to discuss a French plan for the neutralization of both Vietnams. Rusk was skeptical, telling Alphand: "To us, the defense of South Vietnam has the same significance as the defense of Berlin." He argued that the Berlin issue and the Vietnam War were part of the same global struggle against the Soviet Union, and the United States could not falter anywhere.

Just after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, Rusk supported the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. On August 29, 1964, during the presidential election campaign, Rusk called for bipartisan support for U.S. foreign policy and criticized Republican nominee Barry Goldwater for creating "mischief." In September, he stated that Goldwater's critiques "reflect a basic lack of understanding" of a U.S. President's handling of conflict.

On September 7, 1964, Rusk advised Johnson to exercise caution regarding military measures in Vietnam until diplomacy had been exhausted. However, he grew frustrated with the constant infighting among South Vietnam's junta of generals. After a failed coup against Nguyễn Khánh on September 14, Rusk messaged Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor in Saigon, instructing him to "make it emphatically clear" to Khánh that Johnson was tired of the internal conflicts. Rusk emphasized that the U.S. had provided "massive assistance... in military equipment, economic resources, and personnel in order to subsidize continuing quarrels among South Vietnamese leaders." Reflecting Washington's general vexation with South Vietnam's political instability, Rusk argued to Johnson: "Somehow we must change the pace at which these people move, and I suspect that this can only be done with a pervasive intrusion of Americans into their affairs." Increasingly, the sentiment in Washington was that if South Vietnam could not defeat the Viet Cong guerrillas, the Americans would have to step in and win the war. On September 21, Rusk asserted that the U.S. would not be pushed out of the Gulf of Tonkin, and the continued presence of American forces would prevent it from becoming a "communist lake."

In September 1964, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant initiated a secret peace initiative in Burma, supported by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who pressured Ho Chi Minh to participate. U Thant reported to Rusk that Soviet pressure seemed effective, as China, North Vietnam's other arms supplier, could not match Soviet high-tech weaponry. However, Rusk did not press this information on Johnson, stating that participation in the talks would have signaled "the acceptance or the confirmation of aggression." The initiative ended when Khrushchev was ousted in October.

Following the Viet Cong attack on the American airbase at Bien Hoa on November 1, 1964, which killed four Americans, Rusk informed Ambassador Taylor that Johnson did not wish to act immediately due to the upcoming elections, but after the election, there would be "a more systematic campaign of military pressure on the North."

In May 1965, Rusk told Johnson that North Vietnam's "Four Points" peace terms were deceptive because the third point required "the imposition of the National Liberation Front on all South Vietnam." In June 1965, when General William Westmoreland requested 180.00 K troops for Vietnam, Rusk argued that the U.S. had to fight to maintain "the integrity of the U.S. commitment" worldwide. Despite some doubts about Westmoreland's assessment, Rusk warned the president in a rare memo that if South Vietnam were lost, "the Communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war." He also stated that the U.S. should have committed more heavily in 1961, believing that earlier troop deployment would have prevented current difficulties.

Rusk frequently clashed with his Undersecretary of State, George Ball, over Vietnam. When Ball argued that the South Vietnamese governing duo of Thieu and Ky were "clowns" unworthy of American support, Rusk retorted: "Don't give me that stuff. You don't understand that at the time of Korea we had to go out and dig up Syngman Rhee out of the bush where he was hiding. There was no government in Korea, either. We're going to get some breaks, and this thing is going to work." Rusk believed Ball's memos advocating for American withdrawal should be seen by as few people as possible and consistently argued against Ball in National Security Council meetings.

In 1964 and 1965, Rusk unsuccessfully requested British troops for Vietnam from Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Rusk, normally Anglophile, viewed the refusal as a "betrayal," reportedly telling the Times of London: "All we needed was just one regiment. The Black Watch would have done it. Just one regiment, but you wouldn't. Well, don't expect us to save you again. They can invade Sussex and we won't do a damn thing about it."

Shortly before his death, Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson II mentioned in an interview the aborted peace terms in Rangoon in 1964, stating that U Thant was disappointed by Rusk's rejection. When questioned by Johnson, Rusk distinguished between "rejecting a proposal and not accepting it," claiming U Thant had missed the distinction.

In December 1965, when McNamara advised Johnson to pause the bombing of North Vietnam, Rusk estimated only a 1 in 20 chance that it would lead to peace talks. However, he supported the pause, arguing, "You must think about the morale of the American people if the other side keeps pushing. We must be able to say that all has been done." When Johnson announced the bombing pause on Christmas Day 1965, Rusk told the press, "We have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Vietnam." Some of the language in Rusk's peace offer, such as the demand that Hanoi publicly vow "to cease aggression" and the assertion that the bombing pause was "a step toward peace, although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped," seemed designed to provoke rejection. On December 28, 1965, Rusk cabled Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. in Saigon, presenting the bombing pause as a cynical public relations exercise: "The prospect of large-scale reinforcements in men and defense budget increases for the next eighteen-month period requires solid preparation of the American public. A crucial element will be a clear demonstration that we have explored fully every alternative but the aggressors has left us no choice." Rusk ordered Ambassador Henry A. Byroade in Rangoon to contact the North Vietnamese ambassador with an offer to extend the bombing pause if North Vietnam made "a serious contribution to peace." The offer was rejected, as North Vietnam refused peace talks until bombing ceased "unconditionally and for good," viewing the bombing as a violation of their sovereignty. In January 1966, Johnson ordered the Rolling Thunder bombing raids to resume.

In February 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Fulbright, held televised hearings on the Vietnam War, featuring critics like George F. Kennan and General James M. Gavin. Rusk, serving as Johnson's principal spokesman on Vietnam, testified that the war was a morally justified struggle to halt "the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat." Historian Stanley Karnow described the hearings as compelling "political theater" as Fulbright and Rusk debated the war's merits.

By 1966, the Johnson administration was divided between "hawks" (like Rusk, Earle Wheeler, and Walt Whitman Rostow) and "doves" (like McNamara and W. Averell Harriman), with the latter favoring peace talks rather than withdrawal. Rusk equated withdrawal from Vietnam with "appeasement," though he sometimes advised Johnson to open peace talks to counter domestic criticism. On April 18, 1967, Rusk stated that the U.S. was prepared to "take steps to deescalate the conflict whenever we are assured that the north will take appropriate corresponding steps." In 1967, Rusk opposed Henry Kissinger's Operation Pennsylvania peace plan, remarking, "Eight months pregnant with peace and all of them hoping to win the Nobel Peace Prize." When Kissinger reported that North Vietnam would not begin peace talks without a bombing halt, Rusk advocated continuing the bombing, asking Johnson: "If the bombing isn't having that much effect, why do they want to stop the bombing so much?"

In October 1967, Rusk told Johnson he believed the March on the Pentagon was orchestrated by "the Communists" and pressed for an investigation. The subsequent investigation by various intelligence agencies found "no significant evidence that would prove Communist control or direction of the U.S. peace movement and its leaders," a report Rusk dismissed as "naive."

When Johnson first discussed not running for re-election in September 1967, Rusk opposed it, stating: "You must not go down. You are the Commander-in-chief, and we are in war. This would have a very serious effect on the country." By this time, many in the State Department were concerned by Rusk's drinking on the job, with William Bundy noting Rusk was like a "zombie" until he started to drink. McNamara was reportedly shocked to see Rusk drink an entire bottle of scotch in his office. However, Rusk's colleagues generally liked him, and none leaked their concerns to the media.

On January 5, 1968, Rusk sent notes to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, seeking support to avoid recurrence of claimed bombing of Russian cargo ships in the Haiphong port. On February 9, Rusk was questioned by Senator William Fulbright regarding reports of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons introduction in South Vietnam.

The Tet Offensive in early 1968 shook Rusk and other Johnson administration members. During a news briefing, Rusk, typically courteous, snapped at a reporter asking how the administration was surprised: "Whose side are you on? Now, I'm the Secretary of State of the United States, and I'm on our side! None of your papers or your broadcasting apparatuses are worth a damn unless the United States succeeds. They are trivial compared to that question." Despite his anger at the media, he acknowledged public opinion was shifting against the war, recalling Georgians telling him: "Dean if you can't tell us when this war is going to end, well then maybe we just ought to chuck it." Rusk admitted, "The fact was that we could not, in any good faith, tell them." In March 1968, Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Fulbright, who wore a necktie decorated with doves and olive branches. Though Rusk handled the questioning well, the televised hearings further damaged the Johnson administration's prestige. When Fulbright asked for a greater congressional say in the war, Rusk replied that Johnson would consult "appropriate members of Congress." When Senator Claiborne Pell questioned the war's worth, Rusk accused him of "moral myopia" regarding "the endless struggle for freedom."

On April 17, 1968, Rusk admitted the U.S. had taken "some lumps" propaganda-wise but urged persistence in finding a neutral location for peace talks. The next day, he added 10 sites to the initial five proposed, accusing Hanoi of engaging in a propaganda battle over neutral discussion areas.

Just before the Paris peace talks opened on May 13, 1968, Rusk advocated bombing North Vietnam north of the 20th parallel, a proposal strongly opposed by Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, who argued it would wreck the talks. Clifford persuaded a reluctant Johnson to adhere to his March 31 promise of no bombing north of the 20th parallel. Rusk continued his advocacy, telling Johnson on May 21, 1968: "We will not get a solution in Paris until we prove they can't win in the South." During a July 26, 1968, meeting, Rusk agreed with Richard Nixon's statement that bombing provided leverage in the Paris peace talks, saying: "If the North Vietnamese were not being bombed, they would have no incentive to do anything." When Nixon asked "Where was the war lost?", Rusk famously replied: "In the editorial rooms of this country."

In October 1968, Rusk opposed Johnson's consideration of a complete bombing halt to North Vietnam. On November 1, Rusk urged North Vietnam's long-term allies to pressure Hanoi to accelerate their involvement in the Paris peace talks.

4.2.2. Laos, Asian, and Middle Eastern Policy

Rusk continued to support aid to developing nations and low tariffs. In 1961, Rusk disapproved of the Indian invasion of Goa, which he viewed as an act of aggression against NATO ally Portugal, but was overruled by Kennedy, who sought to improve relations with India and noted Portugal's reliance on the U.S. for arms due to the Angolan rebellion. Regarding the West New Guinea dispute, Rusk favored supporting NATO ally the Netherlands against Indonesia, viewing Sukarno as pro-Chinese. Rusk accused Indonesia of aggression for attacking Dutch forces in New Guinea in 1962 and believed Sukarno violated the United Nations Charter, but Kennedy again overruled him. Kennedy prioritized improving relations with Indonesia, which he called "the most significant nation in Southeast Asia," fearing it might turn communist. Rusk later wrote he felt "queasy" about Kennedy's sacrifice of the Dutch to win over Indonesia and doubted the fairness of the "consultation" scheduled for 1969 to determine the territory's future.

In the Middle East, Rusk favored Saudi Arabia in the Arab Cold War against Nasser's Egypt, which was allied with the Soviet Union and sought a pan-Arab state. However, Rusk also argued to Kennedy and later Johnson that Nasser was a "spoiler" who played the Soviet Union against the U.S. for better bargains. Rusk noted that the U.S. had significant leverage over Egypt through the PL 480 law, which allowed the sale of surplus American agricultural production in local currency. Egypt, with its growing population and subsidized food prices, heavily relied on PL 480 food sales, a supply the Soviets could not match. Nasser promised to keep the Arab-Israeli dispute "in the icebox" in exchange for PL 480 sales. Rusk urged resisting congressional pressure to end PL 480 sales, arguing it would push Nasser closer to the Soviet Union and end the leverage maintaining peace between Egypt and Israel. When Nasser sent 70.00 K Egyptian troops into Yemen in September 1962 to support the republican government against Saudi-backed royalist guerrillas, Rusk approved increased arms sales to Saudi Arabia as indirect support for the royalists. On October 8, 1962, a "Food for Peace" deal was signed, committing the U.S. to sell 390.00 M USD worth of wheat to Egypt over three years. By 1962, Egypt imported 50% of its wheat from the U.S. through PL 480, amounting to 180.00 M USD annually, at a time when Egypt's foreign reserves were depleted by military spending.

In May 1963, angered by the quagmire in Yemen, Nasser ordered Egyptian Air Force squadrons to bomb towns in Saudi Arabia. With Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the brink of war, Kennedy, with Rusk's support, sided with Saudi Arabia, quietly dispatching U.S. Air Force squadrons and warning Nasser that an attack on Saudi Arabia would lead to war with Egypt. The warning had its effect. Despite tensions, Rusk continued to argue for maintaining PL 480 food sales to Egypt, believing it was crucial for U.S. leverage over Egypt and keeping the Arab-Israeli dispute "in the icebox."

4.2.3. Relationship with President Johnson

Rusk quickly became one of Johnson's favorite advisors. Just before the 1964 Democratic National Convention, Rusk and Johnson discussed Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who was seeking to be Johnson's running mate. Both agreed that Kennedy was "freakishly ambitious," with Rusk telling Johnson: "Mr. President, I just can't wrap my mind around that kind of ambition. I don't know how to understand it." Rusk's steadfastness, loyalty, and Southern background appealed to the Texas-born Johnson, leading to Rusk's increased visibility and influence during Johnson's presidency.

4.2.4. Major Diplomatic Incidents and Controversies (e.g., USS Liberty Incident)

Rusk drew the ire of supporters of Israel after he publicly stated his belief that the USS Liberty incident was a deliberate attack rather than an accident. He was outspoken: "Accordingly, there is every reason to believe that the USS Liberty was or should have been identified, or at least her nationality determined, prior to the attack. In these circumstances, the later military attack by Israeli aircraft on the USS Liberty is quite literally incomprehensible. As a minimum, the attack must be condemned as an act of military irresponsibility reflecting reckless disregard for human life. The subsequent attack by Israeli torpedo boats, substantially after the vessel was or should have been identified by Israeli military forces, manifests the same reckless disregard for human life. At the time of the attack, the USS Liberty was flying the American flag and its identification was clearly indicated in large white letters and numerals on its hull. It was broad daylight and the weather conditions were excellent. Experience demonstrates that both the flag and the identification number of the vessel were readily visible from the air. At a minimum, the attack must be condemned as an act of military recklessness reflecting wanton disregard for human life. The silhouette and conduct of the USS Liberty readily distinguished it from any vessel that could have been considered as hostile. The USS Liberty was peacefully engaged, posed no threat whatsoever to the torpedo boats, and obviously carried no armament affording it a combat capability. It could and should have been scrutinized visually at close range before torpedoes were fired." In 1990, he wrote: "I was never satisfied with the Israeli explanation. Their sustained attack to disable and sink Liberty precluded an assault by accident or by some trigger-happy local commander. Through diplomatic channels we refused to accept their explanations. I didn't believe them then, and I don't believe them to this day. The attack was outrageous." When an Israeli claim appeared in The Washington Post that they had inquired about U.S. ships in the area before the attack, Rusk telegraphed the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv, demanding "urgent confirmation." U.S. Ambassador to Israel Walworth Barbour confirmed Israel's story was false: "No request for info on U.S. ships operating off Sinai was made until after Liberty incident. Had Israelis made such an inquiry it would have been forwarded immediately to the chief of naval operations and other high naval commands and repeated to dept."

After President of France Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from the common NATO military command in February 1966 and ordered all American military forces to leave France, President Johnson asked Rusk to seek further clarification from President de Gaulle by asking whether the bodies of buried American soldiers must leave France as well. Rusk recorded in his autobiography that de Gaulle did not respond when asked, "Does your order include the bodies of American soldiers in France's cemeteries?"

On June 26, 1968, Rusk assured Berlin citizens that the United States, along with its NATO partners, was "determined" to secure Berlin's liberty and security, while criticizing East Germany's recent travel restrictions as violating "long standing agreements and practice." On September 30, Rusk met privately with Foreign Minister of Israel Abba Eban in New York City to discuss Middle East peace plans.

In the last days of the Johnson administration, the president wanted to nominate Rusk to the Supreme Court. Although Rusk had studied law, he did not have a law degree nor had he ever practiced law. Johnson argued that the Constitution did not require legal experience for Supreme Court service and claimed Senator Dick Russell would ensure his confirmation. However, Johnson failed to account for Senator James Eastland, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, who was a white supremacist and segregationist. Despite being a fellow Southerner, Eastland had not forgotten or forgiven Rusk for allowing his daughter to marry a Black man, and he announced he would block Rusk's nomination.

On January 2, 1969, Rusk met with five Jewish American leaders in his office to assure them that the U.S. had not changed its policy of recognizing Israel's sovereignty. One of the leaders, Irving Kane of the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee, stated afterward that Rusk had successfully convinced him.

On December 1, 1968, citing the halt of bombing in North Vietnam, Rusk stated that the Soviet Union needed to come forward and contribute to advancing peace talks in Southeast Asia. On December 22, Rusk appeared on television to officially confirm the 82 surviving crew members of the USS Pueblo intelligence ship, speaking on behalf of the hospitalized President Johnson.

6.3.1. Criticism related to the Vietnam War

Rusk's strong and consistent support for the Vietnam War made him a frequent target of anti-war protests and political opposition. He viewed the conflict as a crucial test of America's resolve to contain communism globally, arguing that a failure to defend South Vietnam would encourage further aggression from communist powers like China and the Soviet Union, potentially leading to nuclear war. He insisted that the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam's defense was essential for maintaining the "integrity of the U.S. commitment" worldwide.

However, his unwavering stance drew heavy criticism as the war escalated, leading to immense human cost and a deeply divided American public. Critics argued that his policies perpetuated a prolonged and unpopular conflict with no clear path to victory. His son, Richard, publicly criticized his father's role in continuing what he viewed as an "immoral" war, leading to a period of estrangement and psychological strain for Richard, who suffered a nervous breakdown. Historians have noted that Rusk's reserved nature and deep-seated patriotism may have made him "unprepared for the wrenching, introspective, soul-shattering journey that a true reappraisal of Vietnam policy would have involved," preventing him from admitting that "thousands of American lives, and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, might have been lost in vain."

6.3.2. Personal and Political Controversies

Beyond his policy decisions, Rusk faced personal and political controversies. In 1967, he considered resigning when it became known that his daughter, Peggy, planned to marry Guy Smith, a Black classmate from Stanford University. Rusk believed that as a Southerner working for a Southern president, such a marriage, if he did not resign or stop it, would bring immense criticism upon both him and the president. The Richmond News Leader publicly stated that the wedding was offensive and that "anything which diminishes [Rusk's] personal acceptability is an affair of state." However, after discussions with McNamara and President Johnson, he decided not to resign. A year after the wedding, when Rusk was invited to teach at the University of Georgia Law School, his appointment was denounced by Roy Harris, a university regent and ally of Alabama Governor George Wallace, ostensibly because "We don't want the university to be a haven for broken-down politicians," but in reality due to his opposition to Peggy Rusk's interracial marriage.

Rusk's relationship with the media also became contentious. He accused anti-war journalists of "faking" stories and images that portrayed the war negatively. He expressed frustration with what he called the "so-called freedom of the press," arguing that if there were true freedom, major newspapers would have presented the war more positively. During a news briefing at the height of the Tet Offensive, he famously snapped at a reporter: "Whose side are you on? Now, I'm the Secretary of State of the United States, and I'm on our side! None of your papers or your broadcasting apparatuses are worth a damn unless the United States succeeds. They are trivial compared to that question." He later attributed the war's public perception as being "lost... in the editorial rooms of this country."

Concerns about Rusk's drinking on the job also arose in the later years of the Johnson administration, though his colleagues kept these private due to their affection for him. Furthermore, his strong belief that the anti-war movement was controlled by "the Communists," despite intelligence investigations finding no significant evidence, highlighted his rigid anti-communist worldview. The opposition of Senator James Eastland, a white supremacist, to Rusk's potential Supreme Court nomination due to his daughter's marriage, further underscored the personal controversies that intersected with his public life.