EngineerChernobylUkrainianPolitician

Viktor Bryukhanov

Viktor Bryukhanov was the director of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant from 1970 until the 1986 disaster, for which he was imprisoned, though he blamed reactor design flaws.

1. Early life and career

Viktor Bryukhanov's early life and professional journey laid the foundation for his later role at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, marked by his academic pursuits and experience in thermal power generation.

1.1. Birth and education

Viktor Petrovich Bryukhanov was born on December 1, 1935, in Tashkent, then part of the Uzbek SSR within the Soviet Union. He was the eldest of four children, born to a father who worked as a glazier and a mother who was a cleaning lady. Bryukhanov was the only one of his siblings to pursue higher education, graduating in 1959 from the Energy Department of the Tashkent Polytechnic with a degree in electrical engineering.

1.2. Early career in thermal power plants

Upon graduation, Bryukhanov was offered a position at the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan. He began his professional career at the Angren Thermal Power Plant, where he held various positions, including duty de-aerator installer, driver of feed pumps, assistant turbine driver, turbine driver, and senior turbine workshop engineer. By 1960, he had advanced to the role of shift supervisor and, a year later, became the workshop director.

In 1966, Bryukhanov was invited to work at the Slavyanskaya Thermal Power Plant. There, he continued to rise through the ranks, starting as a senior foreman and progressing to head of workshop, eventually becoming deputy chief engineer. He resigned from this position in 1970 to take on the significant task of building a nuclear power plant in Ukraine. Bryukhanov had been a member of the Communist Party of Soviet Union since 1966, and between 1970 and 1986, he was repeatedly elected as a member of the regional district offices of Kyiv, Chernobyl, and Pripyat city committees of the party.

2. Director of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant

Bryukhanov's most significant professional period was his directorship of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, overseeing its construction, initial operations, and ultimately, the devastating disaster.

2.1. Construction and initial operation

In 1970, the Soviet government appointed Viktor Bryukhanov as the director of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and dispatched him to the Ukrainian SSR. In 1971, the energy minister formally assigned him the task of constructing an atomic power plant comprising four RBMK reactors along the banks of the Pripyat River. Initially, Bryukhanov proposed the construction of pressurized water reactors (PWRs), but this recommendation was rejected due to opposition citing safety and economic reasons that favored the RBMK reactor design.

The designated construction site in northern Ukraine near Chernobyl was a desolate area. Bryukhanov reported this to the Soviet government, which granted him ample funds, reportedly around 400.00 M SUR, to proceed with the project. He organized a temporary village known as "Lesnoy" to house workers and their families, even building a schoolhouse. His own family, including his wife, six-year-old daughter, and infant son, joined him in Lesnoy in 1970, before moving into the newly established city of Pripyat by 1972.

Construction faced numerous challenges, including tight schedules, a lack of construction equipment, defective materials, and rampant theft of supplies, which frequently forced the suspension of work while new materials were sourced. These issues led to significant delays. The plant was originally slated for completion in December 1975, but it was completed several years later. Notably, the sarcophagus for the reactor, a crucial safety feature, could not be built before the plant began operation due to material shortages. The first reactor of the Chernobyl Power Plant became operational on August 1, 1977, two years behind schedule and more than seven years after planning and construction commenced. On September 27 of the same year, Ukraine's first nuclear electricity was successfully transmitted onto the Soviet power grid.

2.2. Operational period before the disaster

During his directorship prior to the 1986 disaster, Bryukhanov's primary focus was on the plant's administration, expansion, and the logistical challenges associated with its operation, rather than the intricate details of reactor management. Having an electrical engineering background, he was not a nuclear engineering expert. Therefore, the day-to-day operation of the reactors was largely overseen by Deputy Chief Engineer Nikolai Fomin, who had more direct operational experience.

One significant incident occurred on September 9, 1982, when Bryukhanov presided over the response to fuel element damage at Reactor 1. Contaminated steam was released into the atmosphere, and radioactive contaminants spread as far as 8.7 mile (14 km) from the plant, reaching Pripyat. Despite the known spread of contamination, authorities determined that the public should not be informed, and decontamination efforts were limited to the plant grounds themselves. Reactor 4, the unit that would later be destroyed, became operational in December 1983.

2.3. Chernobyl disaster

The Chernobyl disaster began on April 26, 1986. Bryukhanov was not initially aware of the full extent of the catastrophic event. He had not been informed that another rundown test was being conducted that night. In the early hours of the morning, he received a call from the head of the chemical division reporting an incident at the station. As he was passing by the fourth reactor block on a bus, Bryukhanov observed that the upper structure of the reactor was completely gone. Later, he also found pieces of graphite from the destroyed reactor core scattered near his own home, though he still initially believed he might have just eaten something bad due to nausea.

Upon realizing the severity of the situation, he ordered all authorities to meet at the nuclear bunker located in the basement of the administration building. Bryukhanov attempted to contact the shift supervisor but received no answer from the fourth reactor block. He then activated a "General Radiation Accident" on the automatic telephone system, which transmitted a coded message to the Ministry of Energy. Following this, he had to report the unfolding situation to his superiors in Moscow and to local Communist Party officials.

Initial efforts to assess the situation were hampered by a critical lack of high-range dosimeters, making it difficult for officials to accurately determine if a radiation release had occurred, and if so, its magnitude. Bryukhanov, assisted by Chief Engineer Nikolai Fomin, instructed operators to try and maintain and restore coolant supply to the reactor, unaware that the reactor itself had already been irrevocably destroyed. The civil defense chief informed him that radiation had reached the maximum reading of military dosimeters, 200 roentgens per hour. Around 3:00 a.m., Bryukhanov contacted Vladimir V. Marin, a Communist Party official in Moscow responsible for nuclear matters, to report the accident and, misleadingly, assure officials that the situation was under control. Compounding the confusion, the radiation team incorrectly reported that levels were only 13 microroentgens per hour. By 5:15 a.m., Deputy Chief Engineer Anatoly Dyatlov, who had been overseeing the ill-fated test, arrived at the bunker, bringing operating reports that detailed power levels and coolant pressure charts. Despite personally witnessing the severe damage to the reactor building, Bryukhanov continued to maintain that the reactor core remained intact until well after daybreak. He later reflected: "At night I went to the courtyard of the station. I looked - pieces of graphite under my feet. But I still did not think that the reactor was destroyed. This did not fit in my head. Only later, when the helicopter flew around..." It was only after seeing many helicopters flying around the plant that he fully grasped the reality of the accident.

2.4. Aftermath of the disaster and trial

In the immediate weeks following the disaster, Bryukhanov remained nominally in charge of the plant, though he took to sleeping at the Fairy Tale Pioneer Camp. A criminal investigation was launched on the day of the accident, led by Sergei Yankovsky, who questioned Bryukhanov about the causes. After Bryukhanov took a week's leave on May 22 to visit his family, Party officials arranged for his permanent removal as power plant director. He returned from his vacation to find himself reassigned to a back-office job.

On July 3, Bryukhanov was summoned to Moscow to attend a turbulent Politburo meeting where the causes of the accident were discussed. Key figures present included RBMK designer Anatoly Alexandrov, Efim P. Slavsky of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, and Valery Legasov of the Kurchatov Institute. During this meeting, Bryukhanov was accused of mismanagement. While reactor design flaws were acknowledged as a contributing factor, the Politburo concluded that operator error was the primary cause of the accident. Mikhail Gorbachev expressed strong anger, accusing nuclear designers of decades-long cover-ups regarding dangerous problems within the Soviet nuclear industry. Following the meeting, Bryukhanov was expelled from the CPSU.

Upon his return, Bryukhanov faced further intense questioning from investigators. On July 19, an official explanation was published in the Soviet newspaper Vremya, placing the blame for the disaster entirely on the operators and local management. The KGB later classified the true cause of the accident. Upon hearing the news on television, Bryukhanov's mother suffered a heart attack and died.

Bryukhanov was formally charged on August 12 and subsequently imprisoned by the KGB. Initially, he refused legal representation, believing the verdict was predetermined. However, during a monthly visit, his wife persuaded him to accept legal counsel. As part of discovery procedures, investigators provided him with the materials they had uncovered during their inquiries, which formed the basis of the case against him. Among these materials, Bryukhanov discovered a letter written by a Kurchatov Institute expert that explicitly revealed perilous design faults, which had been concealed from him and his staff for 16 years. On January 20, 1987, after six weeks in isolation, the prosecutor's office submitted its closing indictment to the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. All 48 files of evidence sent to Moscow were classified.

Bryukhanov was charged with gross violation of safety regulations, creating conditions that led to an explosion, mismanagement by understating radiation levels after the accident, and sending people into known contaminated areas. He pleaded guilty to the lesser charges of administrative negligence but contested the more serious accusations of abuse of power. In his testimony, he defended the plant's safety record and highlighted the demanding nature of his duties, offering little further defense, as he understood the outcome was largely predetermined and he had to play his part. He stated: "Initially, on the charge brought against me, on August 13, 1986, when I was charged, I wrote my objections and disagreements on the charges. I disagree with them. I am guilty as a leader, I did not finish something, somewhere I showed negligence, indiscretion. I understand that the accident is serious, but everyone has their own fault in it."

Bryukhanov was found guilty and received the maximum sentence of ten years. He was sent to a penal colony in Donetsk to serve his sentence.

3. Later life

After his conviction and imprisonment, Viktor Bryukhanov's life continued to be intertwined with the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, albeit in a different capacity.

3.1. Imprisonment and release

Viktor Bryukhanov was released early from his ten-year sentence in September 1991 due to good behavior, having served half of his prison term. He had been incarcerated in a penal colony in Donetsk.

3.2. Post-release activities and retirement

Following his release, Bryukhanov initially worked in the ministry of international trade in Kyiv. From 1992, he resided with his wife in the Desnianskyi District of Kyiv. In 1995, he took a position as an employee of Ukrinterenergo, Ukraine's state-owned energy company. In this role, he was actively involved in the liquidation and recovery efforts following the Chernobyl accident. By his 80th birthday in December 2015, Bryukhanov had retired from his work due to failing eyesight, a health issue that significantly impacted his later years. Throughout this period, Bryukhanov consistently stated in various interviews that neither he nor his employees were solely to blame for the Chernobyl disaster, steadfastly claiming that the accident was caused by "the imperfection of technology."

4. Death

Viktor Bryukhanov died in Kyiv on October 13, 2021, at the age of 85. The official cause of his death was not publicly communicated. However, it was known that Bryukhanov had been suffering from a severe form of Parkinson's disease and had experienced a series of strokes in 2015 and 2016, which contributed to his declining health.

5. Personal life and family

Viktor Bryukhanov met his wife, Valentina, at the Angren Power Plant. Valentina was an assistant to a turbine engineer, while Viktor was a trainee recently graduated from university. Valentina, also an electrical engineer, later worked as a senior engineer in the production department of Chernobyl from 1975 to 1990 before her retirement.

The couple had two children:

  • His daughter, Lily, born in 1961, became a pediatrician and resides in Kherson.
  • His son, Oleg, born in 1969, works as a mechanic for automatic CHP-5 management systems and lives in Kyiv.

6. Awards and honors

Throughout his career, Viktor Bryukhanov received several significant accolades from the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR:

  • Laureate of the Republican Prize of the Ukrainian SSR (1978)
  • Order of the Red Banner of Labour (1978)
  • Order of the October Revolution (1983)
  • Medals "For Valiant Labour. In commemoration of the centenary of the birth of V. I. Lenin" and "Veteran of Labour"
  • Certificate of Honour of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR (1980)

7. Legacy and evaluation

Viktor Bryukhanov's legacy is complex, shaped by his leadership during the Chernobyl disaster and the differing perspectives on his responsibility.

7.1. Self-evaluation and views on responsibility

Viktor Bryukhanov consistently maintained his innocence regarding the primary responsibility for the Chernobyl disaster, asserting that the catastrophe was fundamentally caused by "the imperfection of technology." He repeatedly argued that the inherent design flaws of the RBMK reactor, which were allegedly concealed from plant operators and management for years, were the true culprits behind the accident. While admitting to some negligence and imprudence as a leader, he emphasized that every party involved held some degree of fault, underscoring his belief that the blame should not rest solely on him or his staff. His defense highlighted the extraordinary difficulty of his duties and the predetermined nature of his trial's outcome.

7.2. Public and historical evaluation

Public and historical evaluations of Bryukhanov's role in the Chernobyl disaster present a mixed picture. Officially, the Soviet government and the Politburo largely attributed the accident to operator error and local management, directly leading to Bryukhanov's conviction for gross violations of safety regulations and mismanagement. Critics pointed to his alleged understating of radiation levels immediately after the accident and his decision to send personnel into contaminated areas.

However, a more nuanced historical perspective acknowledges several mitigating factors. Bryukhanov, trained as an electrical engineer, lacked direct expertise in nuclear engineering and reactor operations, delegating such responsibilities to his deputy, Nikolai Fomin. The hidden design flaws of the RBMK reactor, later revealed through investigations and even acknowledged by Bryukhanov himself through a concealed letter from the Kurchatov Institute, significantly contributed to the accident. Furthermore, the immense pressure to meet construction deadlines and production quotas, coupled with the highly classified nature of critical safety information within the Soviet nuclear program, painted a picture of systemic failings that extended beyond individual accountability. While some sources attributed Anatoly Dyatlov as the "main culprit" due to his direct involvement in the ill-fated test, Bryukhanov's early release from imprisonment also suggests a societal recognition that his role, though significant, was not the sole or ultimate cause of the disaster. Ultimately, his legacy remains a subject of debate, balancing the official condemnation with the broader context of a flawed system.