1. Biography
Gilbert Ryle's life was deeply rooted in an intellectual and accomplished family background, which shaped his early development and paved the way for a distinguished academic career marked by significant philosophical contributions.
1.1. Family Background
Gilbert Ryle was born into a family with strong academic and professional pedigrees. His father, Reginald John Ryle, was a physician in Brighton who possessed a wide range of interests, including philosophy and astronomy, cultivating a substantial library that greatly influenced his children. Reginald John was also the son of John Charles Ryle, who served as the first Anglican Bishop of Liverpool. The Ryles were an established family of landed gentry from Cheshire, with Gilbert's elder brother, John Alfred Ryle, eventually becoming the head of the family at Barkhale, Sussex.
Gilbert's mother, Catherine, hailed from a prominent architectural family. She was the daughter of Samuel King Scott, who was the younger brother of the renowned architect Sir George Gilbert Scott. Her mother, Georgina, was the daughter of Dr. William Hulme Bodley and sister to the architect George Frederick Bodley, himself a student of Sir George Gilbert Scott. This lineage connected Gilbert Ryle to several notable cousins, including the haematologist Ronald Bodley Scott, the architect George Gilbert Scott Jr., a founder of Watts & Co., and his son, Giles Gilbert Scott, who famously designed the Battersea Power Station.
1.2. Early Life and Education
Gilbert Ryle was born in Brighton, England, on 19 August 1900. He spent his early childhood in a stimulating environment that fostered a deep appreciation for learning. He received his early education at Brighton College. In 1919, Ryle matriculated at The Queen's College at Oxford to pursue classics. However, his academic interests soon shifted towards philosophy. His exceptional intellect was evident in his academic achievements, as he graduated with a remarkable "triple first," earning first-class honours in classical Honour Moderations in 1921, literae humaniores in 1923, and philosophy, politics, and economics (PPE) in 1924, a relatively new and interdisciplinary program at the time.
1.3. Career
Following his impressive academic performance, Ryle embarked on a distinguished career in philosophy. In 1924, he was appointed as a lecturer in philosophy at Christ Church, Oxford. A year later, he became a fellow and tutor at Christ Church, a position he held until 1940.
With the outbreak of the Second World War, Ryle was commissioned into the Welsh Guards. Leveraging his strong linguistic abilities, he was recruited for military intelligence work. By the end of the war, he had attained the rank of Major. After the war, Ryle returned to Oxford, where he was elected Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy and a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. He served in this prestigious position until 1968, when he was succeeded by P. F. Strawson. During his tenure, Ryle was instrumental in the establishment of the Bachelor of Philosophy (BPhil) master's program at Oxford, significantly shaping the philosophy curriculum.
In 1949, Ryle published his seminal work, The Concept of Mind, which would become his most famous contribution to philosophy. Beyond his professorship, Ryle held significant roles within the philosophical community: he served as president of the Aristotelian Society from 1945 to 1946, and he was the esteemed editor of the philosophical journal Mind from 1947 to 1971.
Ryle developed a close relationship with Ludwig Wittgenstein after 1929, though he recorded experiencing a certain discomfort with Wittgenstein's unique teaching style, despite his theoretical respect for him. His brothers also pursued notable careers: John Alfred Ryle became Regius Professor of Physic at the University of Cambridge and served as physician to King George V, while George Bodley Ryle, after directing forestry for both Wales and England, became Deputy-Director of the Forestry Commission and was appointed a CBE.
2. Philosophical Ideas
Gilbert Ryle's philosophical contributions fundamentally reshaped the discourse in the philosophy of mind and language, advocating for a critical re-evaluation of traditional Cartesian thought and introducing innovative concepts that continue to influence contemporary philosophy.
2.1. "The Concept of Mind"
In his highly influential 1949 work, The Concept of Mind, Ryle launched a sustained critique against Cartesian dualism, asserting that it involved fundamental "category mistakes" and led to philosophical "nonsense." Ryle argued that the long-standing Western philosophical notion of the mind as an independent entity, distinct from and yet somehow controlling the body, was a profound error carried over from pre-biological thought, which he deemed superfluous. To illustrate this conceptual error, he famously coined the phrase "ghost in the machine" and also referred to it as the "dogma of the ghost in the machine."
Ryle's arguments highlighted that when one asks "why" human actions occur, seeking answers solely from a mechanistic viewpoint, one falls into a category mistake. He argued that the purpose of discussing the mind-body problem should not be to locate a mysterious, hidden entity, but rather to describe how complex organisms like humans manifest sophisticated behaviors such as abstraction and hypothesis formation based on observable evidence of their actions. He asserted that the functioning of the mind is inseparable from the movements of the body, and that psychological vocabulary is not significantly different from describing bodily actions. For Ryle, the mind is not a "hidden" principle underlying external skills, but rather the way these skills and actions are performed.
He contended that a person's motivation, for instance, does not refer to an explicit inner feeling like "vanity" or "pain," but rather signifies a "tendency" or a general inclination to behave in certain ways under specific circumstances. While novelists, historians, and journalists might freely interpret motives, moral values, and personalities from people's actions, Ryle warned that philosophers create problems by attributing these qualities to an elusive realm called the "mind" or "soul." Furthermore, Ryle offered classic criticisms of early cognitivist theories, pointing out that their explanations often led to an infinite regress: if cognitive behavior requires a cognitive system as a prerequisite, then the formulation of that cognitive system itself constitutes a cognitive action, creating an unending chain of required prior systems without ultimate explanation.
2.2. Key Philosophical Concepts
Beyond his central critique of dualism, Ryle developed several influential concepts that provided new frameworks for understanding knowledge and philosophical inquiry.
2.2.1. Knowing-how and Knowing-that
A significant distinction articulated in The Concept of Mind is that between "knowing-how" (or procedural knowledge) and "knowing-that" (or declarative knowledge). This distinction has garnered considerable independent interest and has been instrumental in the development of procedural and declarative models of long-term memory. It is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy.
Ryle criticized philosophers for concentrating excessively on the discovery of truths or facts ("knowing-that") while largely ignoring or attempting to reduce the discovery of ways and methods of doing things ("knowing-how") to the former. He argued that the traditional view often equated intelligence solely with the contemplation of propositions. An example of this distinction is knowing how to tie a reef knot versus knowing that Queen Victoria died in 1901. The former involves practical skill and performance, while the latter involves propositional knowledge of a fact.
2.2.2. Philosophy as Cartography
Ryle analogized the task of philosophy to cartography or mapmaking, particularly when dealing with the "logical geography" of knowledge. He believed that competent speakers of a language are akin to villagers who possess a practical understanding of their local area and its inhabitants. However, these villagers might struggle to interpret a formal map of their own village until they can translate their practical knowledge into universal cartographic terms. Similarly, a philosopher's role is not to discover new facts or study non-physical objects, but to clarify and rectify the logical structures of the concepts we already use.
By "mapping" the words and phrases within a statement, philosophers can generate what Ryle termed "implication threads." Each word or phrase contributes to the statement's overall meaning in such a way that altering them would change the statement's implication. The philosopher's task is to reveal the "directions and limits" of these implication threads that a concept contributes to the statements in which it appears. This involves "tugging" at neighboring threads, which in turn "tugs" at others, in a process of clarifying conceptual relationships. Philosophy, therefore, aims to understand the meaning of these implication threads within their usage contexts.
2.2.3. Thick Description
Ryle introduced the notion of "thick description" in 1968 through his papers "The Thinking of Thoughts: What is 'Le Penseur' Doing?" and "Thinking and Reflecting." He proposed two types of descriptions:
- Thin description: This refers to surface-level observations of behavior without any contextual or interpretative depth. An example would be: 'His right hand rose to his forehead, palm out, when he was in the vicinity of and facing a certain other human.'
- Thick description: This type of description goes beyond mere observation by adding context, motivations, intentions, and an understanding of how such behavior is interpreted by observers within a particular community or culture. The thick description of the above thin description would be: 'He saluted the General.' This explanation requires knowledge of social conventions, the individual's role, and the meaning ascribed to the gesture.
2.3. Other Philosophical Themes
Ryle's analytical approach extended to various other aspects of human action and cognition. His concept of 'tendency,' discussed in The Concept of Mind, posits that actions are not caused by hidden internal states but are expressions of a person's disposition or inclination to behave in certain ways under specific conditions. For example, a person described as "vain" is not harboring a secret feeling of vanity, but rather exhibits a series of actions and emotional responses that are consistent with a general tendency towards vanity.
Furthermore, Ryle's work includes critiques of early cognitivism. He argued that if cognitive behavior is explained by positing an underlying cognitive system, then the formulation of that system itself requires a cognitive act, leading to an infinite regress and failing to provide a satisfactory explanation for the origins of intelligent behavior.
3. Major Works
Gilbert Ryle's principal published works include:
- 1949. The Concept of Mind
- 1954. Dilemmas: The Tarner Lectures 1953, a collection of shorter philosophical essays.
- 1962. A Rational Animal: Auguste Comte Memorial Lecture Delivered on 26 April 1962 at the London School of Economics and Political Science
- 1966. Plato's Progress
- 1971. Collected Essays 1929 - 1968, a comprehensive collection presented in two volumes, encompassing 57 essays.
- 1977. Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy, which he edited.
- 1979. On Thinking
4. Personal Life
Gilbert Ryle was famously the subject of a portrait by Rex Whistler, which Ryle humorously remarked made him look like "a drowned German General." He remained a lifelong bachelor. In his retirement years, he shared a home with his twin sister, Mary.
5. Death
Gilbert Ryle died on 6 October 1976, in Whitby, North Yorkshire, England.
6. Legacy and Influence
Gilbert Ryle's philosophical work left a profound and enduring mark on academic thought, not only within philosophy but also across various other disciplines.
6.1. Philosophical Reception
Upon its publication, The Concept of Mind was immediately recognized as a significant contribution to philosophical psychology and a foundational text within the ordinary language philosophy movement. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, the landscape of philosophy of mind underwent a significant shift. The rising influence of cognitivist theories, championed by figures such as Noam Chomsky, Herbert A. Simon, and Jerry Fodor, became predominant. These theories, part of a "neo-Cartesian" school, posited the existence of precisely the "internal" cognitive states that Ryle had argued against. The two major post-war schools in the philosophy of mind, Fodor's representationalism and Wilfrid Sellars's functionalism, both relied on such internal states.
Despite this temporary decline in direct influence, Ryle's work has experienced a significant resurgence of interest, particularly within contemporary post-cognitivist traditions in psychology and philosophy. Philosophers like Daniel Dennett, who was a student of Ryle's, have pointed out that recent trends such as embodied cognition, discursive psychology, and situated cognition have brought renewed attention to Ryle's ideas. Dennett provided a sympathetic foreword to the 2000 edition of The Concept of Mind, acknowledging its continued relevance. Today, Ryle remains a crucial theorist for those who argue that highly sophisticated human activities can be explained in a clear and meaningful way without resorting to vague concepts like a disembodied "soul."
6.2. Influence on Other Disciplines
Ryle's concepts have extended their reach beyond the boundaries of philosophy, significantly influencing other academic fields. His notion of "thick description" has been particularly impactful in cultural anthropology. Scholars such as Clifford Geertz have explicitly cited Ryle's concept, embracing it as a fundamental goal and methodology within anthropological inquiry for understanding human actions within their rich cultural contexts.
Additionally, Ryle's arguments against mentalist philosophies have found resonance in other areas. Author Richard Webster, in his 1995 book Why Freud Was Wrong, endorsed Ryle's critique. Webster suggested that Ryle's arguments implied that "theories of human nature which repudiate the evidence of behaviour and refer solely or primarily to invisible mental events will never in themselves be able to unlock the most significant mysteries of human nature." This highlights Ryle's lasting impact on the critical examination of psychological and interpretive frameworks that prioritize internal, unobservable states over observable behavior and contextual understanding.